Abstract. We introduce and motivate the concept of unclonable group identification, that provides maximal protection against sharing of identities while still protecting the anonymity of users. We prove that the notion can be realized from any one-way function and suggest a more efficient implementation based on specific assumptions.
Introduction
A large body of literature studies the problem of group identification, where one wants to verify that a given user is a member of a certain group, while ensuring that the user's personal identity is not revealed. Particular instances of this include group signatures [2, 1, 16] and identity escrow [11] . In some applications, a dishonest user has an interest in giving away to another person the data that allow him to identify himself as a member of the group -such as password and secret keys. The security problems implied by such a scenario have not been given much attention so far in the literature 1 . In this paper we study this type of problem. As a motivating example, consider the issue of software protection: it is well known that one of the strongest motivating factors in getting people to register as software users is if this enables some functionality that cannot be accessed without registration (and payment). This works particularly well, if the functionality requires access to the vendor's website, since then unauthorized access to the functionality cannot be achieved only by reverse engineering the software. In the case of games, for instance, the opportunity to play against others may be available to only registered users, and only through the vendor's website.
Verifying that a user is registered may be done in many different ways. In this paper, we are interested in solutions that work under the following constraints:
-An honest user can connect an unlimited number of times using the same private key material, or at least updates should only be necessary with long time intervals. -We want to protect users' privacy, i.e., honest users have to identify themselves only as registered users and do not have to reveal their personal identities.
-We want to do as much as possible to protect against attacks where a user "clones" himself by handing a copy of his personal data (software, secret key(s), etc.) to another person in order to get the benfits of two registrations while only paying for one.
Note that the cloning attack may be easy or very hard to carry out physically, depending on how the user's personal keys are stored, but only in very few cases can it be considered impossible.
Of course, we can only hope to detect cloning if the user and clone actually connect to the vendor's website. A further trivial observation is that if first the user connects, then leaves the site and then the clone connects, we cannot distinguish this from two connections made by an honest user, since he would also use the same private key material in both cases. An event we can hope to detect, however, is if both user and clone connect so that they are on the site simultaneously, since this is exactly what cannot occur if the user has been honest. In this case, we not only want to detect the attack, we also want to be able to reveal the identity of the user who cloned himself. Note that, apart from the fact that the above simultaneous scenario is the only one in which we can hope to catch a cloning attack, the scenario is also of practical relevance. For instance, the case of a user who buys one copy of a game and distributes it to all his friends so they can play against each other online, is exactly a case where a number of clones would want to be connected simultaneously.
An unclonable identification scheme informally is an identification scheme where honest users can identify themselves anonymously as members of a group, but where clones of users can be detected and have their identities revealed if they identify themselves simultaneously. In this paper, we give a formal definition of this primitive. We show that it can be realized assuming existence of one-way functions (which is clearly a minimal assumption), and we give a more efficient implementation based on specific assumptions. On the technical side, our most efficient solution is based on a new technique for proving in zero-knowledge, given g x in a group of prime order, that x was chosen pseudorandomly from on a committed secret key.
Of course, before attempting a construction such as we have sketched, one should verify if existing primtives already allow solving the problem. First, one might consider using an anonymous E-cash scheme [12, 3] , i.e., some number of electronic coins are issued to each user, and users use them to "pay" for access to the site. This would lead to a functionality that is incomparable to the one we sketched above: Cloning in this case means sharing e-coins with others, and so the cloning attack is exactly double spending and can therefore detected even if the two spendings do not take place simultaneously. But on the other hand, honest users can only use each coin once, and must come back for more coins thoughout the life of the system. This reveals information on how often a user connects, and is also not consistent with our goal, namely a solution where you can join a group once and then identify yourself an unlimited number of times using the same key material.
One may also consider using group signatures [2, 1, 16] , and have users identify themselves by signing a message chosen by the verifier (using his current system time, for instance). This achieves anonymity but does not protect against cloning. To do this, one would need the property that if the same user signs the same message twice, this would result in signatures that could be detected as coming from the same user. This does not follow from the standard definition of group signatures, and is actually false for known schemes, since these are probabilistic and produce randomly varying signatures even if the message is fixed. A similar comment applies to identity escrow schemes [11] .
Definition
An unclonable identification scheme involves a Group Manager GM , a set of Verifiers and some number of Users. The idea is that after some initialization, there will be several events, where some set of users prove "at the same time" to a verifier V that they are members of the group managed by GM . Since we want to detect if V is talking to clones of the same user at the same time, every proof should take as input some string α that represents in some sense the current time or phase of the protocol we are in. However, this does not have to be linked to real time. What is important is that whenever a set of users want to prove themselves, they should agree with V on a value for α that has not been used before. More precisely, the demands are -An honest V must be able to ensure that all users he talks to at a given point prove themselves using the same value of α. -An honest user should be able to ensure that he never executes P rove with the same value of α more than once.
One solution that works in the case where V runs a website that users would like to be connected to for some length of time, is as follows: with regular intervals, e.g., each hour each user who is connected must prove himself using the current date and hour as α, as defined by the verifier's system time. This works if there is sufficient agreement on the time between users and V and if users remember at which time they last did a proof. But many other solutions are possible. Therefore, we have chosen to separate the way time is defined from the definition as such by assuming that the entire system proceeds in consecutive phases, with a unique number assigned to each phase. In each phase, some subset of users decide to prove themselves to some verifier V , and the number assigned to the current phase will be used as the string α. The system is defined by two probabilistic polynomial time algorithms KeyGen, Detect and two two-party protocols Join and P rove. These are used as follows:
-Initially, GM runs KeyGen on input 1 k , to get output public key pk and secret key sk. We assume for simplicity that the set of possible pk's output by KeyGen(1 k ) can be recognized in polynomial time.
-When a user U joins the system he runs Join with GM . Common input is pk. Private input to GM is sk. The protocol outputs to GM either "reject" or a string id. Output to U is "reject" or a membership certificate cert U . We assume Join is executed on a secure channel so that no other entity will have access to the data exchanged. -To prove he is a member of the group, the user U executes protocol P rove with a verifier V . Common input is the public key pk and the string α assigned to the current phase, U uses cert U as private input. At the end of the protocol V accepts or rejects. Each user executes P rove at most once in every phase. -Algorithm Detect gets as input a number of transcripts of executions of P rove, done with pk as input in the same phase. It outputs a (possibly empty) list of strings. The intuition is that this algorithm should be able to tell if the result of one or more cloning attacks are among a given set of proofs, and if so, it will output the identities of the involved users.
Definition 1. The algorithms and protocols in a secure unclonable identification scheme must satify the following:
Completeness Assume GM , V and user U are honest. Execution of KeyGen, followed by executions of Join and P rove always result in V accepting. No Cloning Consider an honest GM who executes (pk, sk) = KeyGen(1 k ). Consider any probabilistic polynomial time algorithmŨ who plays the following game on input pk: in any phase, it can issue one or more of the following requests:
1. It can ask that a set of honest users execute Join with GM (no data returned toŨ ). 2. It can ask to execute Join itself with GM . 3. It can ask that some number of honest users who already joined the group execute P rove withŨ acting as verifier, using pk and the current value of α as input.
Finally,Ũ executes P rove a number of times with an honest verifier V , on input pk and the current value of α. The instances of We now want to capture the idea that in the last step,Ũ can only have proofs accepted by using user identities it got from GM , it must "know" which one of them it is using in each case, and if it uses any of them more then once, the Detect algorithm will catch this.
To this end, we demand that there exists a probabilistic algorithm Extract which gets as input the complete view ofŨ 2 and outputs a user identity, for every instance of P rove that V accepted in the last step. The expected time to runŨ and then Extract must be polynomial. If the scheme is set in the common reference string model, Extract is allowed to choose the reference string to be used inŨ 's attack, the distribution must be the same as in real life 3 . We require that the following holds except with negligible probability: All user identities output by Extract are among those that were generated in the conversations betweenŨ and GM . Furthermore, the Detect algorithm, when given as input the conversation betweenŨ and V , will output exactly those user identities that occur more than once in the output of Extract. Note that this implies that ifŨ did not execute any Join's, there are no user identities Extract can legally output, so we are then in fact demanding that allŨ 's proofs are rejected except with negligible probability. Thus we do not need a separate soundness condition in the definition demanding that non-members are rejected. Anonymity Consider any probabilistic polynomial time algorithmṼ , who will act as both GM and verifier in an attempt to break the anonymity of honest users.Ṽ gets 1 k as input and outputs a valid pk (can be assumed without loss of generality since we assumed that invalid pk's can be easily recognized). It then plays the following game: it interacts with a set of honest users, where in each phase some users execute Join and other users execute P rove with V . Of course, no honest user will attempt to do P rove unless he already did Join successfully. At some pointṼ stops and outputs a bit, and we let p real,Ṽ (k) be the probability that 1 is output. We now want to express the demand thatṼ should only learn what is unvoidable, namely the number of honest users that interact with it in each phase. So we compare the above game to a different one, whereṼ interacts with a simulator M . The simulator gets as input for each phase the number of users who want to execute Join and the number that want to execute P rove in the current phase. These numbers are chosen with the same distribution as in the first game. Let p sim,Ṽ (k) be the probability that 1 is output in this case. We demand that there exists a simulator probabilistic polynomial time simulator M such that for anyṼ , |p real,
We note that in this definition, we have for simplicity used the usual two-phase structure of identification schemes to define soundness and non-cloning, where first the adversary talks to the honest users and then tries to fool the honest verifier. Thus we do not allow him to interact with an honest prover and and honest verifier simultaneously. However, this is not a serious restriction, as there are several techniques that allow handling even this concurrent case, such as the so called designated verifier proofs [7, 4] . These techniques can be used with any of the schemes we propose here.
As for the scheduling of the individual protocols in a single phase, we consider two cases: one where in each phase the proofs given to an honest verifier are composed sequentially, and one where the composition may be concurrent, with a scheduling chosen by the adversary. We speak of sequential and concurrent security, accordingly. On the other hand, we assume that honest users (provers) may interact concurrently with an adversarial verifier.
A Theoretical Solution

Some Tools
We will need a secure string commitment scheme. Such a scheme follows from any one-way function using for instance Naor's construction [13] , where there is a public key P com which is a random string (of length polynomial in the security parameter k) that can be chosen once and for all by the reciever of commitments. We let com P com (str, r str ) denote a commitment to string str using random coins r str . Such a commitment determines str uniquely exept for a negligible fraction of the public keys, and commitments to different strings are polynomially indistinguishable assuming the underlying one-way function is hard to invert.
Based on such a comitment scheme and, for instance, Blum's protocol for Graph Hamiltomicity or the one from [9] for graph 3-colorability, we can build generic proofs of knowledge for any binary relation R that can be checked in polynomial time. The protocol in its basic form is a three move protocol where the second message is a one-bit challenge from the verifier. When we work with security parameter k, we may compose sequentially k instances of this protocol, to obtain a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge for R with negligible soundness error. We may also compose in parallel k instances of the protocol. This is also a proof of knowledge for R, more precisely, on common input x, the prover proves knowledge of w such that (x, w) ∈ R.
Protocols obtained by this parallel composition are special cases of so-called Σ-protocols. By definition, such protocols have three properties: first, conversations are of form (a, e, z), where a = a(x, w, coins P ) is a function of x, w and the prover's random coins, e is a k-bit challenge, and z = z(x, w, coins P , e) is a function of the prover's private data and the challenge. Based on x, (a, e, z) the verifier decides to accept or reject. Second, the protocol is honest-verifier (computational) zero-knowledge (and is therefore witness indistinguishable). Third, the protocol has the special soundness property, i.e., from x and accepting conversations (a, e, z), (a, e , z ) with e = e , it is easy to compute w such that (x, w) ∈ R.
Using a technique known as the OR-construction [5] , one can combine Σ-protocols for two relations R 0 , R 1 , to obtain a new Σ-protocol, where on input x 0 , x 1 , the prover proves he knows w such that (x 0 , w) ∈ R 0 or (x 1 , w) ∈ R 1 , without revealing which is the case, i.e., the protocol is witness indistinguishable.
We will need a family of pseudorandom functions [8] . Such a family is indexed by a key s (a random string of length k bits), and can be designed to have any desired (polynomial in k) input and output length, assuming any one-way function. We let f s () denote such a pseudorandom function. The basic property is that even given oracle access to the function (and not the key), it cannot be efficiently distinguished from a truly random function.
Finally, we will need a secure signature scheme, which can again be built from any one-way function [15] . Such a scheme comes with probabilistic polynomial time algorithms Gen, Sign, V erif y for key generation, signing and verifying signatures. Gen(1 k ) outputs a key pair P sign, Ssign. On input message m and the private key, Sign produces a signature σ = Sign(Ssign, m). On input message, signature and public key, V erif y produces as output V erif y(P sign, m, σ) which is accept or reject.
The Scheme
We first explain the intuition behind the solution: when joining the group, user U will make a commitment c U to a random string r U and will obtain GM 's signature σ U on the commitment. He then proves he is a member of the group by proving that he knows a valid signature σ U on some message c U , without revealing either value. Moreover when giving this proof he uses some random coins. These are not choosen at random but peudorandomly as f r U (α). That is, he obtains the coins by applying the pseudorandom function to the current α-value, using r U as key. He also proves that he has done exactly this. Note that this will force a clone of the user to use the same coins if he gives a proof for the same α-value, by security of the commitment and signature schemes. This idea of choosing the randomness for a proof pseudorandomly is somewhat similar to a technique from a completely different context, namely resettable zero-knowledge [10] .
The proof given is actually a Σ-protocol, so the transcripts of proofs given by user and clone are of form (a, e, z) and (a , e , z ). But when all inputs and random coins are the same in the two cases, we must have a = a . Furthermore, e = e with overwhelming probability, so if both proofs are accepted, special soundness of the protocol means that one can easily compute the prover's secret, which will immediately identify the user in question.
We now describe the components of our scheme -throughout the descriptions, it is understood that a party who detects an invalid proof or signature will immediately stop and reject:
KeyGen On input 1 k , it generates keys (P sign, Ssign) for the signature scheme and public key P com for the commitment scheme (with security parameter k). Finally, it chooses a random k-bit string R. The public key is pk = (P sign, P com, R) while the private key is sk = Ssign. Join The user U sends c U = commit P com (r U , s U ) where r u is a random k-bit string. GM assigns a unique identity id U to U , and sends to U a signature σ U = Sign(Ssign, (c U , id U )) on c U concatenated by id U . Also, GM proves in zero-knowledge that he knows a signature (valid under P sign) on R. This is easy given that GM knows Ssign. The output certificate for U is r U , s U , σ U , id U , while output for GM is id U .
P rove Recall that pk and the string α is common input to the protocol. User U first makes commitments C U , D U , E U to c u , id U , σ U , respectively. He will now give a proof of knowledge related to these commitments, the group public key pk and the number α assigned to the current phase. This proof consists of three ingredients. The first is a proof of knowledge, that U knows how to open the commitments C U , D U , E U to strings c u , id U , σ U such that σ U is GM 's signature on (c U , id U ). While giving this proof, he uses f r U (α) as random coins. That is, the protocol transcript is (a 1 , e 1 , z 1 ), where it should be the case
The second ingredient is a proof that U knows s U , r U such that c U = commit(r U , s U ), and such that the message a 1 from the previous protocol satisfies
. Also this proof is a three move protocol of form (a 2 , e 2 , z 2 ), and we are going to do the two proofs in parallel, so that the overall conversation will have form (a 1 , a 2 , e 1 , e 2 , z 1 , z 2 ). The final ingredient is a proof of knowledge of GM 's signature on the string R that is part of pk. This is combined with the previous ingredients using the OR construction mentioned above, i.e., U is proving that he knows a signature on R, or strings c u , id U , σ U , r U , s U satisfying the conditions just described 4 . Detect Looks at all the proofs given in a phase and finds all places where two conversations include tuples of form (a 1 , a 2 , e 1 , e 2 , z 1 , z 2 ), respectively (a 1 a 2 , e 1 , e 2 , z 1 , z 2 ) and where a 1 = a 1 and e 1 = e 1 . For any such case it will use the special soundness property to extract the underlying c U , id U , σ U , and appends id U to its output list.
Theorem 1.
Assuming one-way functions exist, the above scheme is a secure unclonable identification scheme with sequential security.
We remark that concurrent concurrent security can be obtained under the same assumption in the common reference string model, using a technique similar to the one used in the more efficient protocol we describe later. The key to the proof of the theorem is Lemma 1. The proof of knowledge given by the user during the P rove protocol is witness indistinguishable Proof. Recall that the proof given by U is a combination using the OR-construction of first a proof of knowlegde of a signature on R and second a proof of knowledge of values c u , id U , σ U , r U , s U satisfying a number of properties. Conversations in the latter protocol are of form (a 1 , a 2 , e 1 , e 2 , z 1 , z 2 ). The OR construction leads to a witness-indisinguishable protocol if both protocols used are honest verifier zero-knowledge. This is true for the first protocol, which is just a standard Σ-protocol and so is honest verifier zero-knowledge by construction. It is therefore enough to show that the second protocol is honest verifier zero-knowledge. Some notation for this: the part (a 1 , e 1 , z 1 ) of a conversation will be called proof 1. It has the commitments C U , D U , E U and public key pk as public input, while the secret witness is c U , id U , σ U . The rest of the conversation (a 2 , e 2 , z 2 ) is called proof 2. It has C U , D U , E U , pk, a 1 as public input while the secret witness is c U , id U , σ U , r U , s U .
Both proof 1 and proof 2 are Σ-protocols constructed from generic zeroknowledge techniques as explained above. They therefore have honest verifier simulators M 1 , M 2 respectively. However, note that in our context, proof 1 is not done using the normal prover algorithm, we use pseudorandom coins for the prover, and furthermore the key for this pseudorandomness is used as input in proof 2. Hence a proof is required that we can still use M 1 , M 2 to simulate. We do this by defining a series of distributions where the first is that of real conversations and the last is the one output by the honest verifier simulator we propose. The result will then follow from arguing that each distribution is computationally indistinguishable from the previous one.
The sequence of distributions are produced as follows:
1. Run the honest prover U 's algorithm (with known secret witnesses and random challenges). 2. Same as above, but proof 2 is replaced by running the honest verifier simulator M 2 (C U , D U , E U , pk, a 1 ) for proof 2. Note that this requires that r U is known, to do proof 1 according to the protocol. However, we will still get something indistinguishable from the previous distribution. This is because the output of M 2 is indistinguishable from a real conversation, even to someone who knows the secret witness for proof 2. Indeed, M 2 is simulating a protocol constructed from generic techniques based on any commitment scheme as explained earlier. This means that the simulation essentially produces a set of commitments, some of which are opened and some are not. The unopened commitments have contents different from what would be the case in a real conversation, however, this is the only difference. By the hiding property of the commitments, this difference cannot be detected in polynomial time, even knowing what the commitments are supposed to contain. 3. As 2., but the commitment c U is replaced by a commitment to a random value. This is indistinguishable from 2. by the hiding property of commitments. 4. As 3., but when doing proof 1, instead of using r U to compute pseudorandom values for the random coins, we use oracle access to the function f r U (). We now do not know r u explicitly, but we will produce exactly the same distribution as in 3. 5. As in 4., but the oracle access to f r U () is replaced by oracle access to a random function. This is indistinguishable from 4. by pseudorandomness of the function f r U (). 6. As in 5., but the transscript of proof 1 is now generated by running the honest verifier simulator M 1 for proof 1. This is indistinguishable from 5., since there, we ran proof 1 following the prover's normal algorithm, using real random coins. Summarizing, this last distribution is generated by first running M 1 (C U , D U , E U , pk) to get (a 1 , e 1 , z 1 ), and running M 2 (C U , D U , E U , pk, a 1 ) to get (a 2 , e 2 , z 2 ), and this defines the desired honest verifier simulation.
We can now proceed with the proof of the required properties. Anonymity: ifṼ behaves such that at least one instance of the Join protocol completes successfully with non-negligible probability, then we can extract from the proof of knowledge given byṼ a signature on R. Note that no attempts to do P rove would occur before this point. Given this signature, it is trivial to simulate (without rewinding) all subsequent instances of P rove knowing only the number of instances to be done in each phase. This cannot be distinguished from the real game by witness indistinguishability of the underlying proofs of knowledge.
No cloning: we first describe the required Extract algorithm. It will, for each proofŨ had accepted in the last stage of the attack, rewindŨ to the start of this proof and try to extract the secret witness it is using by the standard rewinding technique of sending random challenges toŨ until it answers a new challenge correctly. At this point a valid witness can be extracted. each such witness must include either a signature on R, or a signature σ U on a pair of form (c U , id U ). Extract outputs id U in the latter case, and a random string in the former. We put the limitation that the algorithm gives up on a proof and outputs a random string if it rewinds more than 2 k times, where k is the length of challenges. To estimate the running time of this, note that the probability thatŨ will have a proof accepted, given the state it is in just before the proof, is determined by the number T of challenges it will answer correctly. The probability that we will have to run Extract on the proof is T 2 −k , while the number of rewinds we have to do is 0 if T = 0, 2 k if T = 1 and 2 k /(T − 1) if T > 1. It follows that contribution to the total expected running time from each proof is polynomial. The total expected running time is just the sum of these contributions since we compose sequentially.
To finalize the argument, we need the following Claim: we may assume that in the output of Extract, we will only see triples (c U , id U , σ U ) that were obtained earlier byŨ in some instance of Join. Indeed, if this is false with non-negligible probability, we can break the signature scheme in a chosen message attack: we choose at random to either ask for signatures on all pairs c U , id U or a signature on R and use this to simulate the Join protocols done byŨ and all proofs by honest users given toŨ (without rewinding, we just follow the protocol). Then by witness indistinguishability,Ũ 's behavior will be essentially the same as before, so the knowledge extraction fromŨ will give us a signature on a new message with non-negligible probability.
Consider now any two of the P rove instances where the same triple c U , id U , σ U is extracted. Let (a 1 , a 2 , e 1 , e 2 , z 1 , z 2 ), (a 1 , a 2 , e 1 , e 2 , z 1 , z 2 ) be the transcripts of the two proofs where knowledge of c U , id U , σ U was proved. Now, soundness of the Join protocol implies that we can also extract two pairs (r U , s U ), (r U , s U ) such that
and that
But we must have r U = r U , or the the binding property of the commitment scheme is broken. This immediately implies that a 1 = a 1 , and therefore, since e 1 = e 1 with overwhelming probability, Detect will sucessfully extract id U , a required in the definition
A More Efficient Solution
In this section, we present a more efficient unclonable group identification scheme, based on two main ingredients: First a technique recently proposed by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [1] for digital signatures based on bilinear groups, with protocols for proving knowledge of a signature on a committed value. Second, a new technique for proving that an element in a group is of form g ψ where ψ is a pseudorandom value computed from a committed key. We will borrow some notation from [1] (and several earlier papers): given a public string x, a private witness w and a predicate pred, P K{w : pred(x, w)} means that we execute a Σ-protocol for the relation {(x, w)| pred(x, w) = true}, that is, a prover convinces a verifier that he knows w such that the predicate on x and w is satisfied. We will also use the following variant:
where κ is a bit string. This stands for the following: we execute the underlying Σ-protocol in the normal interactive way, except that the verifier sends as the second message a random string κ, and the challenge the prover has to answer is determined as H(x, a, κ), where H is a hashfunction, modelled as a random oracle and a is the first message in the original protocol. The point of this construction is that it allows simulation of the protocol without rewinding, due to the "programmability" of the random oracle, and (for the same reason) it also allows knowledge extraction by standard rewinding. Since we will need the last point for the proof, we cannot just use the Fiat-Shamir heuristic.
Proofs of Knowledge with Pseudorandom Exponents
In this subsection, we introduce some tools to be used in our construction. To this end, we consider a group G p of prime order p. We will assume p is chosen as a safe prime, i.e., p = 2q + 1 where q is also prime. G q will denote the (unique) subgroup of Z * p of order q. We further consider the case where a prover knows exponents
l for publically known β, η, α 1 , ..., α l ∈ G p . A standard Σ-protocol for prover P and verifier V can be used to prove knowledge of the x i 's. We can also easily add extra conditions on the x i , such as x 1 = x t . That is, we want:
Since a Σ protocol for this will be useful for us later we write it explicitly here:
1. P chooses r 1 , ..., r l ∈ Z p uniformly at random subject to r 1 = r t and sends to V a i = α ri i for i = 1..l. 2. V chooses a random challenge ∈ Z p . 3. P responds with z i = r i + x i mod p for i = 1..l. V checks that
It is well known (and straightforward to show) that this protocol is indeed a Σ-protocol for the underlying relation.
We now consider a change to this protocol where P chooses the randomness in the first message according to a pseudorandom function Ψ K (i, α, b), where K is a key committed to by P , α is a public input, i is a number and b is a bit. We will use a variant of the pseudorandom function of Naor and Reingold, based on the DDH assumption in G q , so that outputs from Ψ are in G q . We specify below how the function works and how the key is committed. However, in the previous protocol, the random exponents were chosen in Z p , whereas the pseudorandom function produces output in the subgroup G q . To resolve this, we let the exponents be chosen as the difference between two pseudorandom values, which allows us to hit all of Z p . The modified protocol then works as follows:
1. P sets, for i = t r i = Ψ K (i, α, 0) and s i = Ψ K (i, α, 1) and r t = r 1 and sends to
i , and that z 1 = z t .
To argue that this is a Σ-protocol for the same relation, we make the following Assumption 1 -The distribution of u i − v i mod p where u i , v i are chosen uniformly in G q , is statistically close to uniform over Z p . -The distribution of g u , where u is uniform over G q is computationally indistinguishable from uniform over G p .
Lemma 2. Under Assumption 1 and the DDH assumption in G q , the above protocol is a Σ-protocol for the relation specified in (1).
Proof. Completeness is trivial, and special soundness follows exactly as for the previous standard protocol. For honest verifier zero-knowledge, we argue as follows: To simulate, we will choose and z i at random in their respective domains and then choose the a i , b i at random in G, subject to
i , and that z 1 = z t . Now, assuming K is known only to P , pseudorandomness of Ψ implies that our variant is indistinguishable from a protocol where Ψ K (i, α, 0), Ψ K (i, α, 1) are replaced by uniformly random choice u i , v i from G q . This creates a distribution of z i that is statistically close to the simulated distribution one by the first item in Assumption 1. Finally, we observe that the prover generates the a i , b i as g i raised to exponents in G q whereas the simulator chooses them uniformly in G p . These cases are indistinguishable by the second item in Assumption 1.
Detect Look at all proofs given in a phase and find all places where two conversations include tuples of the form (τ 1 , τ 2 , ω 1 , ω 2 ), respectively (τ 1 , τ 2 , ω 1 , ω 2 ) where τ 1 = τ 1 , τ 2 = τ 2 , ω 1 = ω 1 , ω 2 = ω 2 . If the two challenge values involved in these two conversations are different, use the special soundness property to extract a witness for the proof in question -this will be a pair of form (c U , ρ, s). Output all c U 's found this way.
Theorem 2. Assuming security of the signature scheme from [1] , the DDH assumption in G q , and Assumption 1, the scheme described above is a secure unclonable identification scheme in the random oracle model, with sequential security. The Join and P rove protocols are constant-round, and have communication complexity O(k) bits, respectively O(k 2 ) bits.
The scheme described here is extremely similar in structure to the theoretical solution we gave earlier, so the proof is very similar as well. We only sketch it here. Completeness follows by inspection of the protocols. For no cloning, the required Extract algorithm will use standard rewinding to extract witnesses for all proofs given. By a standard argument, this will succeed for all proofs that were accepted by the verifier, with overwhelming probability. Soundness of the proofs imply that the adversary must have used the key involved correctly, and hence the values of τ 1 , τ 2 , ω 1 , ω 2 will be identical in all instances of subproof (3), where the same key was used. This allows Detect to recover the required information (see the remark following Lemma 2). As for anonymity, note that all instance of subproofs from (4) can be replaced by (perfect) simulations without changing the view of the adversary. After this change, the key K is only used to call the pseudorandom function, and no other information on K is present, since the commitment c U hides K perfectly. We can therefore use Lemma 2 to conclude that also instances of subproofs from (3) can be replaced by simulations without this being detectable by the adversary.
On Concurrent Security
For both the theoretical and the more efficient solution, it holds that all the proofs given by honest users can be simulated without rewinding. Hence, the only problem in obtaining concurrent security lies in the Extract algorithm that is required for the no cloning property, and which requires rewinding in both solutions.
To avoid this, we can use the common reference string model. We will place in the reference string a public key pk for an encyption scheme. This should be a key for Paillier encryption [14] in the efficient solution. The idea is that in the P rove protocol, U will send an encryption E pk (c U ) -where c U is the commitment signed by GM to the key of the pseudorandom function. Of course, U will be required to prove that the ciphertext was correctly formed -in the efficient solution, the fact that in Paillier encryption the plaintext "sits in the exponent" implies that this can be done efficently using well-known techniques, see e.g. [6, 16] .
